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  1 On the Equivalence of Import Tariff and Quota:   
The Case of Rice Import in Taiwan 
 
Chi-Chung Chen, Ching-Cheng Chang, and Min-Hsien Yang 
 
Abstract 
This paper extends the existing theory on the equivalence of import tariff and 
quota.    If the equivalence is defined on the domestic price level (weak equivalence), 
then either the zero conjectural variation for domestic country or a perfectly 
competitive market will be sufficient to support  this  equivalence.  If  the  equivalence 
is defined both on the same domestic price level as well as tariff rate (strong 
equivalence), then the conditions are that either domestic country acts as a Cournot 
competitor and foreign country is a price taker, or both domestic and foreign country 
are price takers.    An empirical spatial-equilibrium trade model is constructed to 
simulate the impacts of import tariff and quota.    Using Taiwan’s rice import as an 
example, the empirical results show that if Taiwan switches from the quota system to 
tariff system, the domestic rice price as well as total social welfare can be increased 
given the same import volume. 
  2 1. Introduction 
Rice is the major crop in Taiwan agricultural sector.    There are about 3.5 million 
rice farmers cultivating 40 percent of total planting acreage and contributing up to 21 
percent of total crop production values in 2001.    Rice consumption in Taiwan is 
about 58 kg per capita per year.    The annual total demand is about 1.5 million metric 
tons, which can be met by domestic supply.    Each year, about 100,000metric tons of 
rice is exported. 
After the accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on January 2002, 
Taiwan began to open its rice market to importation.    A total of 144,720 metric tons 
of rice are imported under the quota system annually, which is approximately 10 
percent of total rice production in 2000.  Because rice is the most important crop 
and staple food in Taiwan, there is a strong support for maintaining domestic supply 
essential to food security.  After a long period of protection, the opening to 
importation is predicted to have significant impacts on the 3.4 million rice farmers as 
well as the viability of the industry. 
Due to the similar cultural and production background, Taiwan’s rice import 
policy followed that of Japan in the previous WTO negotiations.    However, on 1 
April 1999 Japan changed its rice import policy from quota to tariff rate quota (TRQ) 
system.    This has created a strong pressure for Taiwan’s government to make the 
similar change in the on-going WTO negotiations.    The purpose to implement trade 
restriction policy, such as tariff or quota, in most rice importing countries is to 
maintain price stability once their domestic markets are linked with the global market.   
The domestic prices under tariff system may not be the same as it is under the quota 
systems.    From the practical standpoint, whether Taiwan should switch from quota to 
tariff depends on if tariffication could generate a higher domestic price and/or welfare. 
The main purpose of this study is to derive a theoretical basis for the comparison 
of the domestic prices under alternative import regimes.    Previous studies on the 
conditions of equivalence between import tariff and quota in an importing country 
focused on the market structure and the welfare distribution effects.    Taiwan’s 
domestic rice market is perfectly competitive because there are many buyers and 
  3 sellers in this market.    The quota rents are fairly distributed to all importing firms 
under the open-bid system.    Therefore, the only possible source of non-equivalence 
between tariff and quota comes from the import market.     
The main findings of our theoretical model include: 
(a) Weak Equivalence: if the equivalence is defined on domestic price, then the 
conditions are that either domestic country acts as a Cournot-competitor or as a 
price-taker;  
(b) Strong Equivalence: if the equivalence is defined on both domestic price and 
tariff rate, then the conditions are that either domestic country acts as a 
Cournot-competitor and foreign country is a price taker, or both domestic and 
foreign country are price-takers. 
(c) If domestic market behaves collusively, then domestic price under import tariff is 
higher than it is under quota, and vice versa. 
In the empirical analysis, the domestic market structure will be analyzed to 
evaluate the extent to which tariff and quota are equivalent.  The conjectural 
variation (CV) method will be adopted to measure the degree of competitiveness in 
the rice import market.  A mathematical-programming-based spatial equilibrium 
model is used to carry out the empirical analysis.    Preliminary results show that: 
(a)  the rice import market is not perfectly competitive, and 
(b)  if Taiwan switches from quota to tariff, then the domestic rice price and total 
social welfare will be increased under the same import level. 
In the following section, the theory of the equivalence of import tariff and quota 
will be discussed while the empirical model is illustrated in the third section.    The 
simulation results and economic interpretations are discussed in fourth section 
followed by the conclusions.   
 
2. Theoretical Analysis 
Following Bhagwati, Shibata, and Yadav’s definition, the equivalence of import 
tariff and quota is “a quota will give rise to an implicit tariff rate which, if 
alternatively set as a tariff, will generate the same level of imports as the quota.”  
  4 According to this definition, the equivalence is held under following three conditions: 
1) perfect competition in the domestic market, 2) perfect competition among 
quota-holders, and 3) price-taking foreign suppliers.    However, if the equivalence is 
defined as the same domestic price under the same import quantity, then the 
monopolist (Shibata) or monspsony (Yadav) case will hold. 
  Huang and Mai have shown that the equivalence is held under zero conjectural 
variation in an oligopoly market if the equivalence is defined as the same domestic 
price given the same level of import quantity under the quota and tariff systems.   
Zero conjectural variation means that both sides of the market are price followers.   
Itoh and Ono have proven that no matter which kind of leader-follower relationship is 
chosen under the tariff system, a quota always bring about a higher domestic price 
than the tariff as long as both permit the same amount of imports.    This infers that 
the equivalence condition of tariff and quota is not only dependent on the players’ 
strategies in an oligopoly game, but also on government’s trade policies. 
  Like her neighbors Japan and South Korea, Taiwan government has distorted rice 
production through price support programs.    A guaranteed-price purchasing program 
is implemented to encourage rice production.    Taiwan government has also 
controlled at least 20 percent of domestic demand in public storage.    To prepare for 
the impact of opening the rice market, the government has let 100,000 hectares of rice 
fields to lay fallow or convert to other crops.    As part of its commitment to the 
Geneva-based world trade body, Taiwan allows rice imports of 144,720 metric tons in 
the first year after joining the WTO, and will increase the import by 2 percent each 
year until the ban is totally abolished.    On the 144,720 tons, only 35 percent is 
imported by private sector (i.e., food companies and rice milling factories).    The 
majority 65 percent is for the government to import.    Therefore, in this paper 
Taiwan’s government is assumed to be a sole representative of all domestic rice 
  5 growers against foreign imports. 
Suppose there exist n foreign firms in Taiwan importing rice market and the 
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th foreign country.    The following analysis will focus on the 
comparison of tariff and quota systems.     
 
Case 1. Import Tariff: 
Suppose Taiwan implements an import tariff on rice and the explicit tariff rate is 
t.    The profit function for the i
th foreign trading country under import tariff is 
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and is the marginal cost.  MC
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λ is a conjectural variation term for domestic country. 
  6 Case 2. Quota System 
  If Taiwan implements a quota system, the summation of importing quantity for 
all foreign countries will be a fixed quantity.    If the ratio of quota over domestic 
demand is not too high, foreign country will be a price taker under this quota system.   
So the optimalization problem for foreign country i is 
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where  f q   is the import quota which is a fixed amount. 
The equilibrium condition for (3) is 











where    is the shadow price when the quota is binding and it represents the implicit 
tariff rate. 
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The domestic country’s profit function is as follow 
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The first order condition of (5) is 










The economic impacts of import tariff and quota on importing countries, especially on 
domestic prices, could be estimated by comparing equations (4) and (6).    Since the 
level of importing quantity is the same under both the tariff and quota system, we 
could obtain the following results   
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  7 quota system, and    are the domestic equilibrium price and quantity under the 
tariff system. 




  Equation (7) shows that the equivalence of the import tariff and quota would 
hold if the domestic country acts as a Cournot-Competitor (i,e,  =0).  However, 
the domestic price is lower under tariff than it is under quota system if the domestic 
country behaves more competitively than it does in the Cournot case (i,e,  <0).  If 
the conjectural variation term is positive which implies that if the domestic country 
acts more collusively than it does in the Cournot case, then the domestic price under 
tariff will be higher than it is under quota.    Such results are similar with Hwang and 
Mai, and Fung. 
d λ
d λ
  Although the comparison of domestic price through equations (4) and (6) can be 
used to determine the equivalence of tariff and quota, the comparison of explicit and 
implicit tariff rate is still necessary.    Shibata has pointed out that the domestic price 
will be the same for both the tariff and quota under Bhagwati’s three conditions, but 
this is not true between explicit and implicit tariff rates.    The explicit tariff rate is not 
equal to the implicit tariff rate due to quota implementation if the foreign player is a 
monopolist.  The  explicit  and  implicit  tariff rates could be compared through 
equations (1) and (2), which is dependent upon the domestic and foreign firms’ 
behaviors ( and ).    Domestic price and quantity are the same under tariff and 
quota if  =0 and  =0.    In other words, implicit tariff rate is higher than explicit 
tariff rate if both the domestic and foreign countries are Cournot players.    If foreign 
player is a price taker ( =-1) and domestic country plays a Cournot game( =0) , 
then the implicit tariff equals the explicit one (i.e.,  .  Similarly,  implicit  tariff 
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t < µ
  8 game ( =0) but foreign country plays a collusive game( >0).  All  possible 
results are organized in Table 1.    Three propositions can be obtained: 
d λ f λ
λ
Proposition 1 (Weak Equivalence):    Suppose the quota system is fairly distributed in 
the domestic market.    If the equivalence is defined on the same level 
of domestic price (weak equivalence), then the conditions are that the 
domestic player acts as either a Cournot competitor ( =0) or a price 
taker ( =-1). 
d λ
d λ
Proposition 2 (Strong Equivalence):    Suppose the quota system is fairly distributed 
in a domestic market.    If the equivalence is defined on the domestic 
price and the implicit/explicit tariff rate, then the conditions for the 
equivalence are that domestic player acts either as a Cournot 
competitor ( =0) and foreign country a price taker ( =-1), or 
domestic and foreign countries both act as price takers ( =-1, 
=-1). 
d λ f λ
λd
f λ
Proposition 3:    Suppose the quota system is fairly distributed in a domestic market. 
If domestic country plays more competition( <0) or both domestic 
and foreign country play as Cournot- Competitors( =0,  =0), then 
the implicit tariff rate is larger than explicit tariff rate( ).  
However, if domestic country plays a collusive game and foreign 
country acts as a price taker ( >0, =-1) or domestic country acts as 
a Cournot competitor and foreign country plays a collusive game 
( =0, >0), then the implicit tariff rate is smaller than explicit tariff 
rate ( ).  
d
d λ f λ
t > µ
d λ f λ
d λ f λ
t < µ
 
  9 3. The Empirical Model 
  According to the previous illustrations, the equivalence or non-equivalence of 
import tariff and quota depends on the conjectural variations (CVs) of both domestic 
and foreign countries.    In this paper, an imperfect spatial equilibrium model is 
constructed to solve for the CVs using the international rice market as an example.   
This model is modified from a specific type of spatial equilibrium models as 
discussed in Nelson and McCarl and implemented by Kawaguchi et al. and Chen at el. 
  Generally speaking, rice can be separated into two different types, Japonica and 
Indica, because of its quality and taste differences.    The major consumption regions 
for Japonica rice are in Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, U.S., and Australia while the 
consumption areas for Indica are located in U.S., Thailand, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, Philippine, South Asia, and Africa.  Following  Armington’s  separable 
assumption, Japonica and Indica can be viewed as two different kinds of products in 
international trade.    In this study, we will concentrate on Japonica rice, which is the 
major rice consumed and produced in northeast East Asia. 
The major exporting countries for Japonica product are U.S. Australia, and China 
while the major importing regions are Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Europe, Africa, 
and Other Asia regions.    The exclusive importers include the Food Agency in Japan, 
the Ministry of Agriculture in South Korea and  Taiwan.  Similarly,  rice  procurement 
and trade in China are controlled by the Chinese government and COFCO (Ackerman 
and Dixit).     
Suppose there are m exporting and n importing countries in the rice market.   
Also suppose that the inverse excess supply function for exporter i, i=1,…,m, is linear 
and is defined as   
( 8 )                       i i i i E d c P * + =
where  and   are the volume exported and export prices and  ,  are  intercept  i E i P i c i d
  10and slope of the inverse excess supply curve.    Similarly, the inverse excess demand 
function in importing country j, j=1,...,n, is   
( 9 )                       j j j j M b a P * − =
where  and  are the import price and quantity, and  ,b are the intercept and 
slope respectively. 
j P j M j a j
  Suppose there exists positive trade between all exporting and importing countries.   
Let    denote the volume shipped from exporting country i to importing country j. 
The following equations hold at equilibrium: 
ij x
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  The objective function and constraints are similar to those by Chen et al and they 
are listed as follows: 
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where  is a transportation cost from exporting country i to importing country j. 
is the CV for exporting country i when selling to country j telling how other 





































12 1 1 ... ... .  
ij B is the CV for importing country j when buying from country i telling how other 
importers buying from country i react to changes in country j’s import purchases. 
  11 Mathematically, 


































... ... . 
In this objective function, the first and second terms calculate the areas under the 
excess demand curves minus the areas under the excess supply curves while the third 
term subtracts off the transport costs.    Collectively, these three terms follow those 
from the classical spatial equilibrium model (Takayama and Judge) and represent 
trade under perfect competition (or free trade).    The fourth and fifth terms 
incorporate the CVs and represent the exporting and importing market rents due to 
imperfect competition. 
  The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are 
( 1 4 )                 
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 (
cos ] [ ] [
≤ + − + −
− + − − =
∂
∂
ij ij i ij ij j
ij i i i j j j
ij
x B d x A b
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Since   and , equation (14) under a positive trade 
activity(i.e.,  >0) can be written as   
j j j j M b a P * − =
ij x
i i i i E d c P * + =
( 1 5 )               0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( cos = + − + − − − =
∂
∂
ij ij i ij ij j ij i j
ij




 If  both  A  and equal -1, then exporter i and importer j would be acting as 
perfect competitors as in the Takayama and Judge’s model.    If  equals zero while 
equals -1, then exporting country i acts as an imperfect competitor who will not 
change their exports in response to i’s action in a Cournot-Nash context while 
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  12be linked with equations (1) and (2).      is identical with in equation (1) 
and is identical with in equation (2) if index j is referred as Taiwan.    Therefore, 
the estimation on  and could determine the equivalence of import tariff and 
quota.  
ij A f λ
ij B d λ
ij A ij B
    To build the imperfect spatial equilibrium model, quantity, price, and elasticity 
for both the importing and exporting countries have to be collected.    The empirical 
model is based on 1998 available statistics.    The data are mostly from Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO) and Agricultural Statistics of USDA and own 
calcultion.    After the model is built, it has to pass the validation test before policy 
simulation.    A refinement procedure is introduced to adjust the estimation of CVs so 
that the discrepancies between the observed data and the model solution can be 
minimized.    This procedure involves an initialization phase where initial values for 
the CVs are computed based on the wedges between the existing prices in each pair of 
trading partners. 
From Table 2, it shows that the deviation of model solutions and observed data 
are under 7 percent which indicates that the model has passed the validation test.   
The trading countries’ behavior in Japonica markets can be found in Tables 3 and 4.   
Exporting countries, such as China and Australia, act as a price maker with respect to 
all  importing  countries.  Another  major  exporter, the US, behaves as a price taker 
with respect to European and other Asia countries but a price maker against Japan.   
All importing countries’ CVs are positive which indicates that there may exist highly 
restrictive import policies in these countries.    There exists political and economic 
incentive to implement trade policy to protect their rice sectors in Asian countries due 
to the food security concern.    Such trade policy will result in higher price difference 
between the importing price and domestic one.    Therefore, the CVs will be positive 
  13numbers in these countries. 
4. Simulation Results 
The import regime of rice in Taiwan is a quota system according to the GATT 
agreement.    It will be allowed approximately 144,000 metric ton import each year.   
To simulate the economic impacts of import tariff and quota, the empirical model has 
to be modified.    The equilibrium condition of (11) under an import tariff system is 
modified as follows:   
( 1 6 )             ,  0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( cos = + − + − − − − ij ij i ij ij j ij i j x B d x A b tar t t P P
where tar is an import tariff.    An addition item ( ) should be included into the 
objective function.    The optimal import tariff rate (tar) is iterated until the import 
volume is same as the quota.    The simulation result shows that when the import tariff 
rate is 210% the import volume will be 144,000 metric tons rice.    Meanwhile, the 
CV for Taiwan ( ) with respect to China, US, and Australia under import tariff is 
1.65, 11.35, and 2.03 respectively.    From the comparison results in Table 1, the 
domestic price under import tariff will be higher than it is under the quota because of 
the positive CV terms. 
ij x tar*
d λ
To simulate the quota system, a maximal volume constraint is added into the 
model to bind the import volume at 144,000 metric tons.    The shadow price of this 
binding equation represents the implicit tariff rate.    The simulation results (Table 5) 
under this quota restriction show that the domestic price is $883 per ton, which is 
lower than the domestic price generated by import tariff ($1,437).    This empirical 
result is in accordance with the theoretical ones listed in Table 1.    Although the trade 
surplus under tariff is smaller than it is under the quota, the total welfare (trade 
surplus plus the tariff revenue) will be higher under the tariff than the quota case. 
The CVs for China, US, and Australia ( ) with respect to Taiwan under import  f λ
  14tariff are all positive, while the CVs for Taiwan ( ) with respect to these three 
exporting countries are all positive too.    Thus, the comparison of implicit and 
explicit tariff rate will be ambiguous from Table 1.    However, the empirical model 




5. Concluding Comments 
After the accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on January 2002, 
Taiwan began to open its rice market to importation.    A total of 144,000 metric tons 
of rice are imported under the quota system annually, which is about 8% of the 
annual consumption.  Because rice is the most important crop and staple food in 
Taiwan, there is a strong support for maintaining domestic supply essential to food 
security.  After a long period of protection, the opening to importation is predicted 
to have significant impacts on the 340,000 rice farmers as well as the viability of the 
industry. 
Due to the similar cultural and production background, Taiwan’s rice import 
policy followed that of Japan in the previous WTO negotiations.    However, on 1 
April 1999 Japan changed its rice import policy from quota to tariff rate quota (TRQ) 
system.    This has created a strong pressure for Taiwan’s government to make the 
similar change in the on-going WTO negotiations.    From the practical standpoint, 
whether Taiwan should switch from quota to tariff depends on if tariffication could 
generate a higher domestic price and/or welfare. 
The main purpose of this study is to derive a theoretical basis for the comparison 
of the domestic prices under alternative import regimes.    Previous studies on the 
conditions of equivalence between import tariff and quota in an importing country 
focused on the market structure and the welfare distribution effects.    Taiwan’s 
domestic rice market is perfectly competitive because there are many buyers and 
sellers in this market.    The quota rents are fairly distributed to all importing firms 
under the open-bid system.    Therefore, the only possible source of non-equivalence 
between tariff and quota comes from the import market. 
  15The main findings of our theoretical model include: 
(d) Weak Equivalence: if the equivalence is defined on domestic price, then the 
conditions are that either domestic country acts as a Cournot competitor or 
behaves like a price taker;   
(e) Strong Equivalence: if the equivalence is defined on both domestic price and 
tariff rate, then the conditions are that either domestic country acts as a Cournot 
competitor and foreign country is a price taker, or both domestic and foreign 
country are price takers. 
(f)  If domestic market behaves collusively, then domestic price under import tariff is 
higher than it is under quota, and vice versa. 
In the empirical analysis, the conjectural variation (CV) method is intorduced to 
measure the degree of competitiveness in the rice import market.  A 
mathematical-programming-based spatial equilibrium model is used to carry out the 
empirical analysis.    The results show that: 
(a)  the rice import market is not perfectly competitive, and 
(b)  if Taiwan switches from quota to tariff, then the domestic rice price and 
total social welfare will be increased under the same import level. 
  16Table 1.    The Equivalence of Import Tariff Rate by Players’ Behaviors 
Domestic 
Firm ( )  d λ
Foreign 
Firm( )  f λ
Price, Quantity, and Tariff Rate 
0 
* *
t P P = ,  
* *
t Q = Q ,     t > µ
-1 
* *
t P P = ,  
* *
t Q = Q ,     t = µ
Cournot Competitor 
( =0)  d λ
>0 
* *
t P P = ,  
* *
t Q = Q ,     t < µ
0 
* *
t P P < ,  
* *
t Q > Q ,   ambiguous  t , µ
-1 
* *
t P P < ,  
* *
t Q > Q ,     t < µ
Collusive 
( >0)  d λ
>0 
* *
t P P < ,  
* *
t Q > Q ,   ambiguous  t , µ
0 
* *
t P P > ,  
* *
t Q < Q ,     t > µ
-1 
* *
t P P > ,  
* *
t Q < Q ,     t > µ
Close to Competition 
( <0)  d λ
>0 
* *
t P P > ,  
* *
t Q < Q ,     t > µ
Price Taker ( =-1)  d λ -1 
* *
t P P = ,  
* *




Table 2.        Model Validation by Trade Volume, 1998 
 Unit: metric ton, % 
  Observed Data  Model Solutions  Deviation (%) 
U.S. 402,637  374,702  -6.94 
Australia 116,463  110,120  -5.45 
China 175,900  184,313  4.78 
Japan 499,383  461,374  -7.61 
South Korea  61,618  65,868  6.90 
Other Asia  50,000  52,534  5.07 
Europe 34,000  36,359  6.94 
Africa 50,000  52,999  6.00 
 
  17Table 3. Conjectural Variations for Exporting Countries 
 U.S.  Australia  China 
Japan 0.24  5.68  2.10 
South Korea  -0.83  1.98  -0.34 
Other Asia  -1.01  1.37  -0.75 
Europe -0.99  1.43  0.02 





Table 4. Conjectural Variations for Importing Countries 
 Japan  South  Korea  Other  Asia  Europe  Africa 
U.S.  14.79 73.53  9.80 144.86 8.56 
Australia  2.79 36.74 4.46 76.14 8.56 





















Quota 883.38 168,363  0  168,363  50% 
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